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How Does Tax Avoidance Affect Corporate Transparency? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines how tax avoidance affects corporate transparency. Using a large sample of 
U.S. firms from 1995 to 2016, we find a significant non-linear effect of tax avoidance on 
transparency. That is, when a firm’s tax avoidance is low, an increase in tax avoidance improves 
transparency; however, when a firm’s tax avoidance is high, an increase in tax avoidance decreases 
transparency. These results are robust to using alternative measures of transparency and tax 
avoidance and in several additional tests. Overall, the findings suggest that the effect of tax 
avoidance on transparency depends on the aggressiveness of firms’ tax avoidance behavior. Our 
study contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of tax avoidance. 
 
 
  
2 
 
How Does Tax Avoidance Affect Corporate Transparency? 
1. Introduction 
This study examines how corporate tax avoidance affects corporate transparency. The mixed 
evidence from the prior literature on the effect of tax avoidance on financial reporting quality and 
corporate transparency motivates our examination of this association. On the one hand, several 
studies suggest that tax avoidance lowers corporate transparency because of agency problems or 
operational complexity. For example, the agency theory of tax avoidance suggests that firms 
manipulate financial statements to hide their rent extraction behavior using complex tax strategies 
(e.g., Desai 2005 ; Desai and Dharmapala 2006). Consistent with this agency view, Kim et al. 
(2011) find that tax avoidance increases stock price crash risk. However, on the other hand, tax 
avoidance creates cash savings and increases bottom line income, increasing returns to investment 
and reducing the need for managers to manipulate earnings to achieve earnings targets (e.g., 
Dhaliwal et al. 2004  and Cook et al. 2008 ). Also, because of career concerns and other incentives 
(e.g., Kothari et al. 2009 ), managers make forthright disclosures about the improved performance 
resulting from tax avoidance activities.1 Thus, tax avoidance could improve corporate transparency.  
We suggest that the effect of tax avoidance on corporate transparency depends on the 
aggressiveness of firms’ tax avoidance behavior. Following Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), our 
definition of tax avoidance is the continuum of tax-planning activities intended to reduce firms’ 
explicit tax burdens. Along this continuum, tax activities are more or less aggressive. Less 
aggressive tax avoidance activities (e.g., investment in municipal bonds, use of net loss carryover 
or incentive-based management compensation) are not complex and thus do not significantly 
                                                 
1 Prior studies (e.g., Kothari et al. 2009) suggest that managers tend to withhold bad news about firm performance 
and disclose good news more promptly. Thus, when tax avoidance improves earnings and cash flows, managers are 
more likely to communicate with investors through enhanced disclosure, increasing transparency.  
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increase agency costs. However, more aggressive tax avoidance activities (e.g., tax sheltering) are 
inherently complex and could lead to managerial rent extractions potentially offsetting the cash 
tax savings. Therefore, we expect that when tax avoidance is low and less aggressive, tax 
avoidance increases corporate transparency because managers have incentives to disclose 
improved performance. However, when firms engage in more tax avoidance activities that are also 
more aggressive,2 we expect that managers have greater incentives to obfuscate these activities to 
reduce scrutiny from tax authorities or to limit shareholder scrutiny of resource extraction for 
personal gain. In this setting, we expect that corporate transparency to decrease when managers 
use more aggressive tax avoidance activities.  
We use a sample of U.S. firms from 1995 to 2016 to examine the association between tax 
avoidance and corporate transparency. We construct three measures representing the continuum 
of tax avoidance based on GAAP, current, and cash effective tax rates. GAAP effective tax rates 
represent firms’ tax avoidance behavior that affects reported earnings. Current effective tax rates 
further represent the effect of tax deferral strategies beyond GAAP effective tax rates. Cash 
effective tax rates represent actual cash taxes paid. Consistent with the prior literature we multiply 
our effective tax rates by minus one. Thus, higher levels of these measures indicate greater tax 
avoidance. We also use several alternative measures of financial reporting quality and transparency. 
We proxy for high corporate transparency using low absolute value and standard deviation of 
discretionary accruals, a low probability of accounting restatements, small analyst forecast errors, 
low audit fees, low stock price synchronicity (a negative measure of stock price informativeness), 
small bid-ask spread, and low stock price crash risk. These different measures complement each 
                                                 
2 Prior studies provide evidence that firms engage in more tax avoidance activities on the more aggressive end when 
the overall tax avoidance level increases.  For example, Kim et al. (2011) show that a signficant positive correlation 
between tax sheltering probability and long run ETR. 
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other because they represent corporate transparency using accounting outcomes, third-party 
reactions, and stock price behavior.  
Using our proxies for corporate transparency, we first examine the association between tax 
avoidance and corporate transparency assuming a linear association which is an assumption 
common to prior studies. After controlling for other determinants, we find associations between 
tax avoidance and higher absolute value and standard deviation of discretionary accruals, larger 
analyst forecast errors, higher audit fees, lower stock price informativeness, higher stock price 
synchronicity and higher stock price crash risk. These results are consistent with increased tax 
avoidance and lower corporate transparency. In contrast to results using our other transparency 
measures, we find an association between tax avoidance and a lower probability of restatements, 
which suggests higher corporate transparency.  This result is consistent with Lennox et al. (2013).  
We next examine whether the level of corporate transparency varies with the level of tax 
avoidance. If corporate transparency differs with the level of tax avoidance, we expect a non-linear 
association between tax avoidance and corporate transparency. We find evidence of a non-linear 
association between tax avoidance and corporate transparency across all the alternative 
transparency measures. Thus, for firms with low tax avoidance (which is likely less aggressive), 
corporate transparency increases with increases in tax avoidance.  These results are consistent with 
managers disclosing information about additional cash tax savings and improved performance 
when they increase their avoidance from low levels. However, for firms with high tax avoidance 
(which is likely more aggressive), we find that increases in tax avoidance reduce corporate 
transparency consistent with managers obfuscating those activities from tax authorities and 
shareholders. Overall, these results suggest that corporate transparency varies with the level and 
likely aggressiveness of firms’ tax avoidance activities.  
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We conduct several additional analyses to support our results. First, we include firm fixed 
effects to control for time-insensitive omitted variables. Second, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) constrained firms’ ability to manipulate earnings using accruals. Our results are consistent 
using a subsample of observations after 2002. Third, we find consistent results using alternative 
measures of tax avoidance. Fourth, using change tests, we still find that increases in tax avoidance 
improve transparency when tax avoidance is low. When tax avoidance is high, increases in tax 
avoidance reduce transparency. Finally, tax avoidance also has a non-linear effect on corporate 
transparency of the next year.  
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on the 
interaction of financial and tax reporting (e.g.,Hope et al. 2013 ; Law and Mills 2015 ; Kubick et 
al. 2016). Our results suggest that the relation between tax reporting and financial reporting depend 
on the aggressiveness of a firm’s tax avoidance. Thus, our study presents implications of tax 
avoidance for analyzing firms’ information risk. This study provides initial evidence on the point 
at which tax avoidance reduces corporate transparency and thus information available to investors. 
Second, our study contributes to the growing literature on the agency costs of tax avoidance 
(e.g.,Desai 2005 ; Desai and Dharmapala 2006 ). What is unknown in the literature is the point at 
which managers reduce information available to investors and tax authorities because of their tax 
avoidance activities. We also provide evidence on the level of tax avoidance at which agency 
problems or efforts to reduce tax authorities’ scrutiny of tax activities increase. Future research on 
the agency costs of tax avoidance should focus on the subsample of firms with tax avoidance at 
least as high as that suggested in this study. Third, we contribute to the literature on consequences 
to shareholders and tax authorities of firms’ tax avoidance activities. The last decade witnessed an 
increase in corporate tax avoidance, and the increase has attracted significant attention from 
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scholars and regulators. While most prior accounting studies focus on the determinants of tax 
avoidance, the consequences of tax avoidance are relatively under-explored (e.g., Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010 ). Our results suggest that the increased tax avoidance has affected the quality of 
information available to shareholders and regulators. Our study relates to the literature examining 
tax avoidance and the cost of equity capital.  The prior literature suggests that increased avoidance 
lowers the cost of equity capital (e.g., Goh et al. 2016 ) but increases costs of debt capital (e.g., 
Hasan et al. 2014 ; Shevlin et al. 2013 ). A recent study by Cook et al. (2014) finds a non-linear 
association between tax avoidance and the cost of equity. Given the effect of corporate 
transparency on the cost of equity, our findings are consistent with the non-linear effect noted in 
Cook et al. (2014).  
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 provides relevant literature 
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and regression models. We provide 
results in Section 4, and Section 5 provides additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
2.1 Prior studies on tax avoidance 
Corporate tax avoidance has increased over the last three decades; for example, Dyreng et 
al. (2017)find that cash effective tax rates have decreased by approximately 10 percent over a 25-
year period from 1988 to 2012. This trend in tax avoidance has attracted attention from investors, 
regulators, and scholars. The prior tax avoidance literature focuses determinants of tax avoidance. 
Studies have examined ownership structure ( Chen et al. 2010 ;Badertscher et al. 2013 ), individual 
managers (Dyreng et al. 2010 ), equity incentive compensation (Rego and Wilson 2012 ), foreign 
operation ( Rego 2003 ;Dyreng and Lindsey 2009 ), business strategies and product market power 
(Higgins et al. 2015 ; Kubick et al. 2014 ) and regulatory scrutiny (Kubick et al. 2016 ).   
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Few studies have examined the consequences of tax avoidance until recently. Traditional 
views suggest that corporate tax avoidance increases after-tax cash flows thus increasing firm 
value (e.g., Graham and Tucker 2006 and Wilson 2009 ). However, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) 
find that corporate tax avoidance does not increase firm value. Desai and Dharmapala (2006), 
Desai et al. (2007), and Desai and Dharmapala (2011) propose an agency-based theory of corporate 
tax avoidance. Specifically, because of the separation of ownership and control, managers tax 
reporting decisions might not benefit shareholders (e.g., Chen and Chu 2005 ; Crocker and 
Slemrod 2005 ; Slemrod 2004 ). The agency-based theory argues that sophisticated tax avoidance 
transactions could create opportunities for managerial rent extraction. These agency costs could 
cancel out the positive effects of cash tax savings. Their findings have motivated recent research 
to examine the costs associated with tax avoidance.  
Recent studies provide mixed results on the consequences of tax avoidance. For example, 
tax avoidance decreases the cost of equity capital (e.g., Goh et al. 2016 ) but increases the cost of 
debt capital (e.g., Hasan et al. 2014 , Shevlin et al. 2013 ). Cook et al. (2014) suggest that the effect 
of tax avoidance on the cost of equity is non-linear with the cost of equity decreasing for increased 
avoidance at low tax avoidance levels and increasing with increased tax avoidance at high levels 
of tax avoidance. In addition, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find that investors react negatively to 
news of firms using tax shelters. They suggest that revelation of aggressive tax avoidance could 
result in significant reputational costs. However, Gallemore et al. (2014) find that aggressive tax 
avoidance does not induce significant reputation costs to the firm or the top executives.  All these 
studies use accounting information to measure tax avoidance and suggest that investors and 
regulators rely on a firm’s accounting information to assess the value of firms’ tax avoidance 
activities.  
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2.2 Mixed evidence on the association between tax avoidance and transparency 
Several studies in the prior literature have examined the effect of tax avoidance on financial 
reporting quality and corporate transparency with mixed results. The agency theory framework in 
Desai (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006)implies that tax avoidance could help managers 
mislead investors by hiding their rent extraction behavior and withholding bad news (e.g., Desai 
2005 ; Desai and Dharmapala 2006 ). Anecdotal evidence based on recent tax scandals is consistent 
with this view. For example, in an attempt to mitigate investors’ concerns that energy trading firms’ 
earnings lacked the support of operating cash flows, Dynegy misclassified cash flows created by 
using tax shelters as operating cash flows from 2000. This form of tax avoidance overstated the 
company’s operating cash flows by 300 million dollars. Similarly, another energy trading firm, 
Enron used 12 large structured tax shelters to cover its poor operating performance and 
significantly overstated its earnings until the company’s collapse in 2001 (See Kim et al. 2011 for 
a summary of Enron’s tax scandal). Tyco International used the complexity created by tax 
sheltering to mask their rent extraction behavior (See Desai 2005 for a summary of the tax scandal). 
The revelation of the rent extraction in 2002 resulted in the firm’s stock price crash (Kim et al. 
2011 ). At the aggregate level, the frequency of firms restating earnings increased significantly 
during the last two decades (e.g., Lennox et al. 2013 ). Contemporaneous with the upward trend in 
restatements is a significant drop in the average corporate effective tax rates in the U.S. (e.g., 
Dyreng et al. 2017 ).  
Several recent empirical studies also provide evidence of associations between aggressive 
tax avoidance and a more opaque corporate information environment. Frank et al. (2009) find a 
positive association between tax aggressiveness and accrual management, suggesting that 
accounting standards and tax laws allow firms to manage book income and tax income in the 
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opposite directions. Balakrishnan et al. (2018) further examine the association between tax 
avoidance and multiple proxies for corporate transparency, including information asymmetry, 
analyst forecast errors and earnings quality. They argue that tax avoidance increases the 
complexity of firms’ operations and the manager's difficulty communicating with investors. 
Consistent with their expectations, tax avoidance lowers corporate transparency. Donohoe and 
Knechel (2014) also find that more complex tax activities increase financial reporting risk and lead 
to higher audit fees and presumably higher audit effort.3  
However, on the other hand, the prior literature also provides evidence suggesting that tax 
avoidance could improve corporate transparency. Early studies emphasize managers’ trade-offs in 
making tax and financial reporting decisions (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001 ). Although upward 
manipulation of book income and downward manipulation of taxable income is common, upward 
manipulation of book income could also result in higher tax expense. Similarly, underreporting 
taxable income could decrease book-income for financial reporting. Thus, tax avoidance can limit 
managements’ reporting of both book and taxable incomes. Erickson et al. (2004) find that firms 
engaged in accounting frauds pay more taxes to support inflated earnings. Lennox et al. (2013) 
find an association between tax avoidance and a lower probability of committing accounting fraud. 
Thus, these prior results do not support an association between tax avoidance and lower corporate 
transparency.  
2.3 Hypothesis 
As discussed above, tax avoidance has two countervailing effects on corporate transparency: 
a positive effect related to informing investors of the additional cash savings from tax avoidance 
                                                 
3 In a related study, Hanlon et al. (2012) find that large book-tax differences are associated with higher audit fees. 
Large book-tax difference could be due to either earnings management or tax avoidance. The authors suggest that 
their findings are due to earnings management rather than tax avoidance. 
10 
 
and a negative effect from obfuscation of tax avoidance that misleads investors about 
managements’ actions. Most prior studies discussed above use numerous measures of tax 
avoidance based on ETRs (See Appendix B for a summary). These measures represent the 
continuum of tax planning activities intended to reduce explicit tax burdens (Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010 ). We suggest that the evidence indicating countervailing effects of tax avoidance also 
indicates that the effect of tax avoidance on corporate transparency on the less aggressive end of 
the continuum is different from that of tax avoidance on the more aggressive end.  
On the less aggressive end of the continuum, firms can lower tax expense by investing in 
municipal bonds and earnings tax-free interest. Another less aggressive tax avoidance decision is 
the provision of incentive-based compensation rather than cash salaries to management. Section 
162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, restricts public firms’ deduction of “non-performance-based” 
executive compensation to $1 million. However, there are no such limits to qualified performance-
based compensation. While creating cash savings, these less aggressive tax avoidance strategies 
are usually not sophisticated and thus do not decrease corporate transparency.  
However, on the more aggressive end of the continuum, firms can use tax shelters or evade 
taxes by not reporting their taxable income (e.g., Wilson 2009 ). These more aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies (e.g., tax sheltering) are more complex and riskier (Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010 ). Thus, the complexity provides more opportunities for managerial rent extractions, which 
mitigates the positive effect of cash tax savings. The complexity of these activities likely reduces 
corporate transparency. 
Therefore, we predict that the positive effect of additional tax avoidance on corporate 
transparency dominates when a firm’s tax avoidance is low, and the negative effect of additional 
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tax avoidance dominates when a firm’s tax avoidance is high. In other words, we predict a non-
linear between tax avoidance and corporate transparency. Thus, we state our hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis: Additional tax avoidance increases corporate transparency when tax avoidance is low, 
but additional tax avoidance decreases corporate transparency when tax avoidance is 
high. 
 
 
3. Research Design and Variable Measurement  
3.1 Measures of Tax Avoidance 
We use three alternative tax avoidance measures based on effective tax rates (ETRs).4 
Specifically, GAAP ETR is income tax expense divided by pretax income. GAAP ETR reflects 
firms’ tax avoidance behavior affecting reported earnings. Current ETR is current income tax 
expense divided by pretax income. This measure represents the effect of deferral strategies beyond 
GAAP ETR. Cash ETR is cash taxes paid divided by pretax income. To be consistent with the prior 
literature we multiply each measure by negative one so that higher values indicate more tax 
avoidance. Thus, we have three measures of Tax Avoidance (TA GAAP, TA Cash, and TA Current) 
corresponding to the three ETR measures (GAAP ETR, Cash ETR, and Current ETR).  
3.2 Measures of Transparency 
We measure corporate transparency from three perspectives: accounting earnings attributes, 
third-party reactions, and stock-market reactions. Our accounting earnings attributes are proxied 
by three measures, the absolute values of discretionary accruals (AbsDA), 5 standard deviations of 
discretionary accruals (StdDA), and the incidence of accounting restatements (Restate). We 
                                                 
4 We remove observations with negative pretax income, because ETRs calculated using negative pretax income is 
not meaningful. 
5 Frank et al. (2009) use signed discretionary accruals as their dependent variable. To be comparable to prior 
literature, we also use this measure in untabulated.  Results are similar.  
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calculate discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model (see Appendix A).6 We use the 
standard deviation of annual discretionary accruals over a five-year rolling window, to calculate 
StdDA.7 Because measures based on discretionary accruals are subject to potential measurement 
errors (e.g., Lennox et al. 2013), we also use accounting restatements to indicate earnings 
management. Accounting restatements represent low accounting quality (e.g., Defond 2010 ). We 
use OLS regressions for the first two dependent variables and Probit regression for the probability 
of accounting restatements. Higher values of each measure (i.e., AbsDA, StdDA, and Restate) 
indicate lower corporate transparency.  
The behavior of analysts and auditors also relate to the level of corporate transparency. We 
use analyst forecast errors (AFError) and audit fees (AuditFee) to represent the extent of corporate 
transparency in our second set of tests. AFError is the absolute difference between median analyst 
EPS forecasts and actual EPS.8,9 AuditFee is the natural log of total audit fees paid by the firm. 
Low corporate transparency makes earnings forecast more difficult and increases analyst forecast 
errors, and auditors likely charge higher fees for the information risk created by low corporate 
transparency. Higher values of AFError and AuditFee indicate lower corporate transparency. 
We use three measures of stock market reactions to proxy for corporate transparency. 
These measures are stock price synchronicity (Synch), bid-ask spread (Spread), and stock price 
crash risk (Ncskew). Stock price synchronicity is the extent to which market and industry returns 
explain a firm’s weekly returns.10 Higher values of Synch indicate lower corporate transparency. 
Bid-ask spread is the average monthly bid-ask spread with higher values indicating more 
                                                 
6 We require at least 10 observations for each 2 digit SIC-industry-year. 
7 We require all the five years to have discretionary accruals data. We use the residuals from modified Jones model 
to construct StdDA. Results are similar if we use the residuals from the Dechow-Dichev model augmented with 
fundamental variables from the Jones model as in Francis et al. (2005) and Balakrishnan et al. (2018). 
8 Results are similar if we use the mean EPS forecast. 
9 Results are also similar if we scale the forecast errors by beginning stock price. 
10 We require the firm to have data for at least ten weeks of return for the year. 
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information asymmetry between the firm and investors. Stock price crash risk is the negative 
skewness in firms’ weekly stock returns. Following prior research (Kim et al. 2011 ), we use the 
stock price crash risk (Ncskew) in year t+1 as the dependent variable. Greater skewness (Ncskew) 
indicates higher crash risk and lower corporate transparency as managers avoid disclosing bad 
news.  
3.3 Tests Using Accounting Earnings Attributes as Dependent Variables 
To test our hypothesis using the three accounting earnings proxies for corporate 
transparency, we estimate Models 1-3. Specifically, we use the absolute values of discretionary 
accruals (AbsDA) in Model 1, the standard deviation of discretionary accruals (StdDA) in Model 
2, and the incidence of accounting restatements (Restate) in Model 3. We suppress firm and time 
subscripts in all the models in the manuscript for convenience. 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝐴 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
2 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉
+ 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐 + 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼9𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛼10𝑁𝑂𝐿
+ 𝛼11𝑀𝐵 + 𝛼12𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑁 + 𝛼13𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑉𝑜𝑙 + 𝛼14𝐴𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀 
(Model 1) 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐷𝐴 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
2 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐
+ 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼9𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛼10𝑁𝑂𝐿 + 𝛼11𝑀𝐵
+ 𝛼12𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑁 + 𝛼13𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑉𝑜𝑙 + 𝛼14𝐴𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀 
(Model 2) 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1)
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
2 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉
+ 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐 + 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼9𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛼10𝑁𝑂𝐿
+ 𝛼11𝑀𝐵 + 𝛼12𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑁 + 𝛼13𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑉𝑜𝑙 + 𝛼14𝐴𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑒 
(Model 3) 
 
Our hypothesis suggests a non-linear association between tax avoidance and corporate 
transparency. We expect that increases in tax avoidance at the upper end of the continuum decrease 
14 
 
corporate transparency and that increases in tax avoidance at the lower end of the continuum 
increase corporate transparency. As discussed above, higher values of AbsDA, StdDA, and Restate 
indicate lower corporate transparency. Thus, as Tax Avoidance increases from its minimum, we 
expect AbsDA, StdDA, and Restate to decrease, indicating higher corporate transparency. From the 
inflection point, increases in Tax Avoidance should increase AbsDA, StdDA, and Restate indicating 
lower corporate transparency. The inflection point for the non-linear relation equals -𝛼1/(2×𝛼2).
11 
Because our measure of tax avoidance ranges from -1 to 0, the inflection point should be negative. 
Thus, we expect the coefficients on Tax Avoidance and the squared term of Tax Avoidance to be 
positive. 12    
Following prior studies (e.g., Frank et al. 2009 ), we include control variables correlated 
with both tax avoidance and the dependent variables. The controls include firm size (LnTA), 
leverage (LEV), foreign pretax income (ForInc), property, plant and equipment (PPE), intangible 
assets (Intang), pretax return on assets (PTROA), change in pretax operating cash flow (d_PTCFO), 
net loss carryover (NOL), and market to book ratio (MB). Following Lennox et al. (2013), we 
control for firms with a Big N auditor (BigN). Trading volume (TradeVol) controls for managers’ 
incentives to influence the stock market. We also control for analyst coverage (AnlstCover), 
because firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less (Yu 2008 ). We include fixed 
effects for Year and Industry to control the time and industry factors affecting corporate 
transparency.13 We provide detailed definitions of all variables in Appendix A. 
                                                 
11 For example, if we take the first derivative of the Model 1 to 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, then we get 𝛼1 +
2 × 𝛼2 × 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0. Thus, the inflection point of tax avoidance for the non-linear relation is -𝛼1/(2×𝛼2). 
12 Quadratic regression models with square terms are widely used in prior studies to examine non-linear effects 
(e.g.,Das and Lev 1994 ;Beneish and Harvey 1998 ; Gul et al. 2010). 
13 Industries are defined based on 2-digit SIC code. 
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3.4 Tests Using Third-Party Reaction as Dependent Variables 
𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
2 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐
+ 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼9𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼10𝑆𝑢𝑚_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛼11𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑉 + 𝛼12𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑉𝑜𝑙 + 𝛼13𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀 
(Model 4) 
 
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
2 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐
+ 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼9𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼10𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑁 + 𝛼11𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑐
+ 𝛼12𝑀𝐴𝑂 + 𝛼13𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀 
(Model 5) 
 
We test our third-party reactions proxies for corporate transparency by estimating Models 
4-5. In Model 4, AFError is the absolute difference between median analyst EPS forecasts and 
actual EPS. In Model 5, AuditFee is the natural log of total audit fees paid by the firm. We expect 
that tax avoidance increases analysts forecast errors and audit fees when tax avoidance is high 
because firms’ reporting and tax activities become more complex. When tax avoidance is low, 
increases in tax avoidance lowers analysts forecast errors and audit fees. Similar to the tests using 
earnings attributes we expect a positive sign for Tax Avoidance and the squared terms of Tax 
Avoidance. 
Consistent with Gu et al. (2013) and Balakrishnan et al. (2018), in Model 4 we use the total 
number of analyst forecasts (Sum_Forecast), cash dividends (CashDV), and stock trading volume 
(TradeVol) as determinants of analyst forecast errors (AFError). Because institutional investors 
have incentives to bias sell-side analyst forecast (Gu et al. 2013 ), we also control the percentage 
of institutional investor ownership (InstHolding). In Model 5, we follow prior studies ( Donohoe 
and Knechel 2014 ; Hanlon et al. 2012 ) and control for Big N clients (BigN), receivables (AccRec), 
firms receiving a modified audit opinion (MAO), and the auditor’s first year to audit the firm 
(Tenure). We also include the following control variables from the earnings attributes tests. The 
controls include firm size (LnTA), leverage (LEV), foreign pretax income (ForInc), property, plant, 
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and equipment (PPE), intangible assets (Intang), and pretax return on assets (PTROA). In addition, 
we control for the effect of total accruals (TACC) on analyst forecast errors and auditor behavior 
(e.g., Bradshaw et al. 1998 ). Fixed effects for year and Industry are included to control the time 
and industry factors affecting auditor and analyst behavior. We provide detailed definitions of 
these variables in Appendix A. 
3.5 Tests Using Stock Price Behavior as Dependent Variables 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
2 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐
+ 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼9𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼10𝐴𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼11𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼12𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀 
(Model 6) 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
2 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐
+ 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼9𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼10𝐴𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼11𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼12𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼13𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑉𝑜𝑙 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀 
(Model 7) 
 
𝑁𝑐𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
2 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉
+ 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐 + 𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼9𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼10𝐴𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼11𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼12𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼13𝑑_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛼14𝑅𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼15𝑁𝑐𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀 
(Model 8) 
 
We test our three stock market reactions proxies for corporate transparency by estimating 
Models 6-8 we use as dependent variables in Models 6 to 8. Higher values of stock price 
synchronicity (Synch), bid-ask spread (Spread), and stock price crash risk (Ncskew) indicate lower 
corporate transparency. Thus, similar to the prior two sets of tests, we also expect the coefficients 
on Tax Avoidance and the squared terms of Tax Avoidance to be positive. 
For the tests of Synch, we control for analyst coverage (AnlstCover), institutional 
ownership (InstHolding) (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone 2004 ), and the natural logarithm of stock 
price (Price). We also control for stock trading volume (TradeVol) when using Spread as the 
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dependent variable (e.g., Balakrishnan et al. 2018 ). For the tests of Ncskew, we use analyst 
coverage (AnlstCover) and institutional ownership (InstHolding), the natural logarithm of stock 
price (Price), change in stock turnover rate (d_Turn), sample mean of firm-specific weekly returns 
(Ret), and stock price crash risk in year t-1 (Ncskewt) as independent variables consistent with Kim 
et al. (2011). We also control for other common control variables included in previous regressions. 
They include firm size (LnTA), leverage (LEV), foreign pretax income (ForInc), property, plant, 
and equipment (PPE), intangible assets (Intang), pretax return on assets (PTROA), and total 
accruals (TACC). We include fixed effects for year and industry to control the time and industry 
factors affecting stock price behavior. We also provide detailed definitions of variables in 
Appendix A. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample Selection and Descriptives  
We obtain data from several publicly available databases. We obtain financial, and stock 
return data from Compustat_CRSP Merged dataset. Audit fee and accounting restatement data are 
from AuditAnalytics. Analyst forecast data are from I/B/E/S. Institutional ownership data are from 
Thomson-Reuters. 
We provide the sample selection in Table 1. Our original sample includes observations of 
all the US firms in the Compustat_CRSP Merged dataset. We delete 2,769 observations with 
missing CIK code or Ticker used to merge AuditAnalytics, I/B/E/S, and Thomson-Reuters. We 
delete 41,474 observations of financial and utility firms (i.e., firms with SIC 4900-4999 or 6000-
6999). We also delete 33,060 observations with missing or negative pretax income because 
positive pretax income is required to calculate a meaningful, effective tax rate. We also delete 
8,068 observations with missing data necessary to calculate discretionary accruals and other 
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financial variables. Thus, our final sample is 42,840 firm-year observations for the test of the effect 
of tax avoidance on earnings quality, when we use GAAP ETR and Cash ETR to construct measures 
of tax avoidance. When we use Current ETR, the sample reduces to 41,579. For other tests, we 
also delete observations with data missing for proxies of corporate transparency or the responding 
control variables. When restatement is the dependent variable, we use the sample before 2014 to 
allow adequate time for reporting restatements. For the tests using stock price behavior as 
dependent variables, we also delete observations where the stock price is smaller than 1$ or book 
value is negative following Kim et al. (2011). When we use StdDA, Restate, AFError, AuditFee, 
Synch, Spread and Ncskewt+1 as dependent variables, the sample size further reduces to 33,766 
observations, 38,488 observations, 26,691 observations, 28,242 observations, 31,523 observations, 
31,632 observations, and 30,640 observations respectively.  
We report sample descriptions in Panel A, Table 2. We winsorize ETRs to the range [0,1]14. 
We winsorize all other continuous variables at 1% and 99%. The sample means of GAAP ETR, 
Cash ETR, and Current ETR are 32.3 percent, 27.1 percent, and 29.9 percent. These are higher 
than the average of similar measures reported in recent studies (e.g., Balakrishnan et al. 2018 ) 
because our sample covers an earlier period (1995 to 2016).15 Statistics of the other variables are 
comparable to those reported in recent studies. For example, the average size (LnTA) is 6.131, 
which is close to the average size (6.350) in Balakrishnan et al. (2018). The average market to 
book ratio (MB) is 2.965, which is close to the mean MB (2.761) reported in Kim et al. (2011). 
New auditors audit 14.4 percent of our sample. Donohoe and Knechel (2014) report 10.6 percent 
for a similar measure. Big N auditors (BigN) audit 52.5 percent of our sample compared to 67.3 
                                                 
14 Results in this paper are similar if we truncate ETRs to [0,1]. 
15 As shown in Panel B, ETRs are lower in the latter years of the period due to higher tax avoidance. 
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percent of observations in Donohoe and Knechel (2014). The average institutional ownership is 
57.0 percent.  
Table 2, Panel B indicates the sample distribution and the mean of alternative tax avoidance 
measures by year (when earnings quality is the dependent variable). The number of observations 
dropped after the financial market crashes in 2001 and 2008, consistent with the delisting of firms 
after the crashes. In addition, we find that the average of all three effective tax rate measures 
dropped significantly from 1995 to 2016, consistent with increased tax avoidance by U.S. firms. 
For example, the average GAAP ETR is 33.1% in 1995 but 29.7% in 2016. For Current ETR and 
Cash ETR, we also observe 4-5% decreases for our sample period.  
4.2 Regression Results 
The first eight columns of Table 3 present results for Models (1) and (2). We cluster all 
standard errors by firm. 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝐴 is the dependent variable in the first four columns; StdDA is the 
dependent variable in the second four columns. In columns (1) and (5), we first replicate prior 
studies results and test the linear relation between tax avoidance and corporate transparency. For 
brevity, we only report results using TA GAAP in these tests. 16 Results are similar if we use TA 
Current or TA Cash. Specifically, we estimate Models (1) and (2) without the squared term of TA 
GAAP. We find that the coefficients on TA GAAP are all positive in columns (1) and (5). These 
findings suggest that firms with higher TA GAAP are associated with higher absolute discretionary 
accruals and a higher standard deviation of discretionary accruals, indicating a negative association 
between tax avoidance and corporate transparency. These results are consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Frank et al. 2009 ; Balakrishnan et al. 2018 ). 
                                                 
16 For other measures of transparency, we also only report the results using TA GAAP in these tests. Results are 
similar if we use TA Current or TA Cash. 
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To test the non-linear association between tax avoidance and corporate transparency, we 
include the square terms of the tax avoidance measures in the models. Our hypothesis suggests 
that the association between tax avoidance and corporate transparency differs between low tax 
avoidance and high tax avoidance. Across all the three proxies for tax avoidance (i.e., TA GAAP, 
TA Current and TA Cash), we find evidence of a non-linear effect. Specifically, we find positive 
coefficients on the three tax avoidance measures and their squared terms. To help with 
interpretation of these results, we provide a visualization in Figure 1 Panel A.17 When the Tax 
Avoidance is low (i.e., firms with tax avoidance lower than the inflection point), corporate 
transparency is higher than at the mean of tax avoidance (i.e., lower absolute value and smaller 
standard deviation of discretionary accruals). However, after the inflection point of Tax Avoidance, 
we find higher absolute values and higher standard deviations of discretionary accruals indicating 
lower corporate transparency.  
We calculate the ETRs corresponding to the inflection points where the absolute values 
and standard deviations of discretionary accruals are the lowest. Importantly, the results indicate 
that all the inflection points are in the range of our tax avoidance measures, suggesting that the 
non-linear effect exists in our sample. These ETR levels at the inflection points are higher than the 
sample average ETRs. Thus, at the sample average ETR level, the marginal effects of tax 
avoidance on absolute discretionary accruals and the standard deviation of discretionary accruals 
is negative. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that the association between tax 
avoidance and corporate transparency is different at high and low levels of tax avoidance. The 
results for the inflection points also suggest at what level of tax avoidance issues related to 
managements’ obfuscation are more likely, a result not provided in prior studies. Also, we report 
                                                 
17 In figure 1, we only use TA GAAP. The figures should look similar if we use TA Current or TA Cash.  
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the proportion of each corresponding sample with ETRs greater than the inflection point. For 
example, using absolute discretionary accruals, 27.7 percent of the sample has a Current ETR 
greater than the inflection point. 
The coefficients on control variables are consistent with expectations. We find negative 
coefficients on firm size (LnTA) across all the twelve columns, suggesting large firms have lower 
absolute discretionary accruals and lower earnings opacity. Further, the coefficients on pretax 
operating cash flows (PTCFO) are negative across all the columns, consistent with firms being 
less likely to manipulate earnings when there are abundant cash flows. The R-squares of all the 
regressions range from 22.0 percent to 23.4 percent.  
The last four columns of Table 3 report the results of estimating a Probit model using 
accounting restatements as the proxy for lower corporate transparency. Consistent with earlier 
estimations, we first estimate the model without the squared term for TA GAAP in Column (9) of 
Table 3. We find a negative association between TA GAAP and the probability of accounting 
restatement, consistent with Lennox et al. (2013). We then incorporate the squared terms of the 
tax avoidance measures in columns (10) to (12). We find significant positive coefficient on the 
three measures of tax avoidance and their squared terms. We also visualize these results in Figure 
1. These results again suggest that when tax avoidance is low (i.e., tax avoidance lower than the 
inflection point), there is a negative association between Tax Avoidance and the probability of 
restatement. When tax avoidance is high (i.e., tax avoidance higher than the inflection point), there 
is a positive association between Tax Avoidance and the probability of restatement. Therefore, 
these results are also consistent with the differential effect of more or less aggressive tax avoidance 
on corporate transparency.  
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We also report the ETRs corresponding to the inflection points where the probability of 
restatements is the lowest. All the inflection points are in the range of our tax avoidance measures. 
Also, the ETR level at the inflections point is close to the sample average when using GAAP ETR. 
Coefficients on control variables are also consistent with expectations. For example, we find 
negative coefficients on LnTA and PTROA (i.e., large firms and firms with higher pretax income 
are less likely to have a restatement).  
Table 4 examines the effect of tax avoidance on corporate transparency based on analyst 
and auditor behavior. Auditors charge higher audit fees for firms with higher information risk, and 
we expect analysts forecast to be more accurate when firms are more transparent. Therefore, higher 
audit fees and larger analyst forecast errors proxy for lower corporate transparency. Again, we first 
estimate our model without the Tax Avoidance squared term in Column (1) of Table 4. We find 
positive associations between TA GAAP and audit fees and analyst forecast errors. The coefficients 
on TA GAAP are significant at the 5% level. These results are consistent with prior research 
indicating positive associations between tax avoidance and audit fees and analyst forecast errors 
(e.g., Donohoe and Knechel 2014 ; Balakrishnan et al. 2018 ). Next, we incorporate the Tax 
Avoidance squared term in columns (2) to (4) and columns (6) to (8). The coefficients on the linear 
and squared tax avoidance terms (except for column 7) are positive and significant. Figure 1, Panel 
B also visualizes these findings. These results again lend support to the hypothesis that more 
aggressive tax avoidance decreases corporate transparency and that less aggressive tax avoidance 
increases corporate transparency.  
Table 5 further examines the effect of tax avoidance on transparency based on stock price 
behavior. Similar to results in Tables 3 and Table 4, we first run the regression without the squared 
term of TA GAAP in Columns (1), (5) and (9) of Table 5. We find positive associations between 
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TA GAAP and stock price synchronicity and stock price crash risk. The association between TA 
GAAP and bid-ask spread is also positive but insignificant. These results are consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Kim et al. 2011 ; Balakrishnan et al. 2018 ). We then incorporate the tax avoidance 
squared terms in columns (2) to (4), columns (6) to (8), and columns (10) to (12). We find positive 
and significant coefficients on the tax avoidance squared terms. Panel C of Figure 1 visualizes 
these results. Consistent with the hypothesis, these results suggest that tax avoidance at the more 
aggressive end of the continuum decreases market-based proxies of corporate transparency and 
that tax avoidance at the less aggressive end of the continuum increases market-based proxies for 
corporate transparency. 
5. Additional Analyses 
We provide several additional tests of the robustness of our findings. Table 6 Panel A 
further controls for firm-fixed effects. Again, we only report the results using TA GAAP in these 
tests, and results are similar if we use TA Current or TA Cash. Tests in six out of the eight columns 
still find significant results consistent with our hypothesis. For columns (6) and (7), the results 
become insignificant. These tests mitigate concerns about omitted time-invariant variables, such 
as corporate governance and management style. 
Table 6 Panel B re-estimates all the tests using TA GAAP in a subsample after 2002. 
Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 (SOX) reduced firms’ ability to manipulate financial reporting. Again, 
results are similar if we use TA Current or TA Cash. Tests in seven out of the eight columns provide 
significant results consistent with our hypothesis. For columns (6), the results are insignificant. 
Therefore, our conclusions remain robust after SOX. 
Panel C re-estimates all the regressions using a three-year long-term tax avoidance measure 
(TA LT3) as a proxy for tax avoidance. Long-term tax avoidance measures better reflect the long-
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term tax planning strategies and helps mitigate the effects of temporary fluctuations in tax rates. 
Specifically, we calculate TA LT3 as the three-year GAAP ETR (see appendix for details about the 
definition of this variable). We find positive coefficients on TA LT3 and its squared term. These 
results are consistent with our hypothesis. We also use long-term tax avoidance measures based 
on three-year Current ETR and three-year Cash ETR as alternative measures of long-term tax 
avoidance in untabulated tests. Results are similar.  
In addition, we use alternative measures of tax avoidance, including the discretionary 
permanent book-tax difference measure (DTAX) in Frank et al. (2009), the book-tax difference 
measure (Total BTD) in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), and the accruals-adjusted book-tax 
difference measure (DDBTD) in Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Untabulated tests using these three 
additional test avoidance measures provide results consistent with our hypothesis.  
Panel D uses change tests to examine the effect of tax avoidance on transparency. 
Specifically, we calculate the one-year changes of all the variables used in the primary analyses. 
Then, we further include TA GAAP  and interact TA GAAP with Δ TA GAAP in the regression 
models. For the first 5 columns , we find signficant posirtive coefficients on Δ TA GAAP and also 
signficant posirtive coefficients on the interaction of Δ TA GAAP and TA GAAP. Because TA 
GAAP ranges from -1 to 0,  the coefficient on Δ TA GAAP is the net effect of Δ TA GAAP when 
TA GAAP is the highest (0).  Further, the difference between the coefficient on Δ TA GAAP and 
that on TA GAAP× Δ TA GAAP is the net effect of Δ TA GAAP when TA GAAP is the lowest (-1). 
We find that the difference between the coefficient on Δ TA GAAP and that on TA GAAP× Δ TA 
GAAP is significantly negative for the first 4 columns. These findings are consistent with our 
hypothesis that increases in tax avoidance improve transparency when tax avoidance is low, but 
increases in tax avoidance decrease transparency when tax avoidance is high. 
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Finally, Panel E uses the tranprency measures from year t+1 as the dependent variables. 
Across all the 7 columns, we still find results consistent with our primary results. These findings 
further mitigate concerns about effects of omitted variables. 
6. Conclusion 
U.S. firms have significantly increased tax avoidance during the last three decades. This 
increase has attracted attention from politicians, news media, regulators, and scholars. Most prior 
research has focused on the determinants of tax avoidance, and the consequences of tax avoidance 
are relatively under-explored (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010 ). Recent studies (e.g., Balakrishnan et 
al. 2018 ) have examined the implications of tax avoidance for corporate financial reporting and 
transparency. However, empirical evidence is mixed. Specifically, prior studies suggest that tax 
avoidance has two countervailing effects on corporate transparency: a positive effect of additional 
cash flows created by tax avoidance and a negative effect because sophisticated tax transactions 
create complexity and opportunities for rent extractions.  
This study further examines how tax avoidance affects corporate transparency. We argue that 
the effect of tax avoidance on transparency depends on the level and potential aggressiveness of 
the tax avoidance behavior. Specifically, less aggressive tax avoidance (e.g., investment in 
municipal bonds, use of net loss carryover or incentive-based management compensation) are 
usually not sophisticated and thus should not increase corporate transparency. However, more 
aggressive tax avoidance (e.g., tax sheltering) is more complex and could lead to more managerial 
rent extractions, which mitigates the positive effect of cash tax savings. Therefore, the positive 
effect of tax avoidance should dominate over the less aggressive end of the tax avoidance 
continuum, and the negative effect should dominate over the more aggressive end of the continuum. 
Thus, we predict a non-linear association between tax avoidance and corporate transparency. 
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Using eight alternative proxies for corporate transparency and three alternative measures of tax 
avoidance, we find evidence consistent with our expectation. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to a better 
understanding of the consequences of tax avoidance. Our findings suggest that future studies 
should separately consider the nature and aggressiveness of tax avoidance behavior in examining 
the consequences of tax avoidance. Second, we also contribute to the literature on the interaction 
of financial and tax reporting. Our findings lend further support to the idea that tax-reporting 
behavior affects financial reporting. Third, our study contributes to the growing literature on 
agency costs of tax avoidance (e.g.,Desai 2005 ; Desai and Dharmapala 2006 ). What is unknown 
in the literature is at what point managers reduce information available to investors and tax 
authorities because of their tax avoidance activities. We provide evidence on the levels of tax 
avoidance that potentially increases obfuscation. Future research on the agency costs of tax 
avoidance should focus on the subsample of firms with tax avoidance at least as high as those 
estimated in this study. Finally, our study is important for investors in understanding the 
implications of tax avoidance for analyzing the information risk. This study provides initial 
evidence of the point at which tax avoidance reduces corporate transparency and thus information 
available to investors. 
Overall, our study supports the association between tax avoidance and corporate 
transparency. However, the direction of the transparency effect of tax avoidance depends on the 
aggressiveness of the tax avoidance behavior. Future studies in the line of literature should more 
carefully consider potentially different predictions for different tax avoidance strategies.   
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Appendix A: Variable Definition 
Variable Description 
AbsDA The absolute value of discretionary accrual. We calculate discretionary accruals 
using the Modified-Jones model. Specifically, we estimate the following 
regression equation for each industry and fiscal year combination: 
 TA𝑗𝑡
Assets𝑗𝑡−1
=
α (
1
Assets𝑗𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡
Assets𝑗𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗𝑡
Assets𝑗𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑗𝑡.  TA𝑗𝑡 denotes total 
accruals for firm j during year t (IBC-OANCF). Assets𝑗𝑡−1 is total assets (AT) at 
the end of year t. ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡 is change of sales (SALE). 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗𝑡 denotes Property, 
plant and equipment (PPE). Then we calculate DisAC by DisAC𝑗𝑡 =
 TA𝑗𝑡
Assets𝑗𝑡−1
−
α̂ (
1
Assets𝑗𝑡−1
) − 𝛽1̂ (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡−∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡
Assets𝑗𝑡−1
) −  𝛽2̂ (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗𝑡
Assets𝑗𝑡−1
). ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡 is 
the change of receivables (RECCH). Please refer to Dechow et al. (1995). We 
require each two-digit SIC code and year combination to have at least ten firm-
year observations when calculating discretionary accrual. 
StdDA Accruals quality. The standard deviation of annual discretionary accruals over a 
five-year rolling window. We estimate discretionary accruals using the 
Modified-Jones model. 
Restate Restatement indicator. It equals 1 if firms restate the financial reports of the 
fiscal year in a subsequent year including fraud restatements and the other types 
of restatements. Restatement data come from AuditAnalytics. 
AFError Analyst forecast error. It is the absolute difference of EPS between median value 
of annual analyst forecast and the actual value. Analyst-forecast data come from 
I/B/E/S.  
AuditFee Audit Fees. The natural log of the fees paid to auditors. Audit-fee data come 
from AuditAnalytics. 
Synch Stock price synchronicity. For each firm-fiscal year, we regress the weekly stock 
return on the weekly market return, the weighted-average weekly industry 
return, and a constant. The weight is the proportion of the market value of each 
firm in the industry. Then we get the R2 of each regression, and compute 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ = 𝐿𝑛 (
𝑅2
1−𝑅2
) as stock price synchronicity. Please refer to Morck et al. 
(2000) and Durnev et al. (2003). 
Spread Bid-ask spread. For each stock, we first find the absolute difference between 
monthly bid (BID) and ask (ASK) in CRSP monthly stock price file. Then we 
calculate the sample mean of this difference for each fiscal year as bid-ask 
spread. 
Ncskew Stock price crash risk. For each firm-fiscal year, we regress the stock return in 
week t on a constant and the CRSP value-weighted market return in week t-2, t-
1, t, t+1 and t+2, and get the residual. Then we calculate firm-specific weekly 
return (𝑤𝑗𝑡) by the natural log of one plus the residual. We get Ncskew of firm j 
in year 𝜏 by: 𝑁𝑐𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑗𝜏 = −
[𝑛(𝑛−1)3 2⁄ ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑡
3]
[(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)(∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑡
2)
3
2]
. Please refer to Kim et al. 
(2011). 
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GAAP ETR GAAP effective tax rate. Total income tax (TXT) divided by pre-tax income 
(PI). We set all ETRs to missing if pretax income is negative or missing. 
Following Lennox et al. (2013), we winsorize all ETRs to the range of [0,1].  
Current ETR Current tax expense (TXT - TXDI) divided by pretax income (PI). 
Cash ETR Cash tax paid (TXPD) divided by pretax income (PI). 
LT3ETR Three-years long-term GAAP ETR, which is the sum of cash tax paid (TXPD) in 
the last 3 years divided by the sum of pretax income (PI) in the last 3 years. We 
set LT3ETR to missing if the sum of pretax income (PI) in the last 3 years is 
missing or negative, and winsorized to the range of [0,1].  
TA GAAP Negative one multiplied by GAAP ETR.  
TA Current Negative one multiplied by Current ETR.  
TA Cash Negative one multiplied by Cash ETR.  
TA LT3 Negative one multiplied by LT3ETR.  
LnTA Firm size. The natural log of total assets (AT). 
LEV Leverage. Total liabilities (LT) divided by total assets (AT). 
ForInc Foreign pretax income. Foreign pretax income (PIFO) scaled by lagged total 
assets (AT). If foreign pretax income (PIFO) is missing, foreign pretax income, 
we set (PIFO) to zero. 
PPE Property, plant, and equipment. Property, plant, and equipment (PPE) scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT).  
Intang Intangible asset (INTAN) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). Set to 0 if the 
intangible asset (INTAN) is missing. 
PTROA Pretax return on assets. Pretax income (PI) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
PTCFO Pretax operating cash flow (OANCF+TXPD-XIDOC) scaled by lagged total 
assets (AT). 
NOL An indicator for net loss carryover. Set to 1 if the firm has net loss carryover 
(TLCF) at the beginning of the year, 0 otherwise. 
MB Market to book value. The ratio of market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO) to 
book value of common equity (CEQ). 
BigN Indicator if the company’s auditor is an international name-brand audit firm, 
which refers to the big 5 auditors before 2002 and big 4 auditors except for 
Arthur Anderson after 2002. Audit-choice data come from AuditAnalytics. 
TACC Total accruals (IBC-OANCF) scaled by beginning total assets. 
Sum_Forecast Natural log of the total number of analyst forecasts in I/B/E/S. 
CashDV Lagged dividends per share (DVPSP_F) scaled by lagged stock price 
(PRCC_F). 
TradeVol Natural log of common share traded (CSHTR_F). 
InstHolding The percentage of institutional investor ownership. This dataset comes from 
Thomson-Reuters Stock Ownership (13-F). 
AccRec Receivables (RECT) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
MAO An indicator for whether a company has received a modified audit opinion 
(going-concern opinion). Audit-opinion data come from AuditAnalytics. 
Tenure Indicator for whether it is in an auditor’s first year to audit the company. Tenure 
data come from AuditAnalytics. 
AnlstCover An indicator for whether there is analysts’ following. It equals 1 if there is at 
least one earnings forecast recorded in I/B/E/S. 
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Price The average of the stock price at the beginning and the end of a fiscal year. We 
include the natural logarithm of the stock price in regressions following 
Balakrishnan et al. (2018). 
d_Turn An indicator for the change of stock turnover rate. It equals 1 if the stock 
turnover rate is larger than last year. The stock turnover rate is common shares 
traded (CSHTR_F) scaled by common shares outstanding (CSHO). 
Ret Sample mean of firm-specific weekly returns (𝑤𝑗𝑡) for each fiscal year. Please 
refer to Kim et al. (2011). 
Year effect Fiscal year dummy. 
Industry effect Dummy of two-digits SIC code. 
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Appendix B: Summary of Tax Avoidance Measures used in Prior Studies 
List of Studies 
Measures of Transparency  
(Variable names from these studies are in the 
parentheses) 
Measures of Tax Avoidance as described in the original studies 
(Variable names from these studies are in the parentheses) 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) 1. The I/B/E/S consensus forecast estimate less 
earnings absent tax expense management [pre-
tax income (#170) × (1 − EtrQ3)*I/B/E/S split 
factor/ common shares to compute basic EPS 
(#54)]. (Miss_Amount) 
2. A dummy variable that equals 1 if 
Miss_Amount > 0, and 0 otherwise. (Miss) 
The fourth-quarter ETR (EtrQ4) less the third-quarter ETR (EtrQ3), where 
the ETR is year-to-date tax expense (#6) divided by accumulated pre-tax 
income (#23). (Etr4_Etr3) 
Erickson et al. (2004) Overstated earnings. Tax paid. 
Cook et al. (2008) A dummy variable that equals 1 if Miss_Amount 
exceeds $0, and 0 otherwise. (Miss) 
Fourth-quarter ETR less third-quarter ETR. (ETR4_ETR3) 
Frank et al. (2009) Financial report aggressiveness, which is 
performance-matched discretionary accruals. (DFIN) 
Discretionary permanent book-tax difference, which is the error term of 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4 ∗
𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5 ∗ ∆𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀. 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡  is total 
book-tax differences less temporary book-tax differences for firm i in year 
t, which is PI-((TXFED+TXFO)/US Statutory tax rate) - (TXDI/US 
Statutory tax rate). 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  is the value of INTAN, 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 is ESUBC, 
𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡  is MII, ∆𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡  is the change of TLCF, and 𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 is TXS. 
𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  is lagged 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 . (DTAX) 
 
Kim et al. (2011) 1. Stock price crash risk. (NCSKEW) 
2. An indicator variable that takes the value one 
for a firm-year that experiences one or more 
firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard 
deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly 
returns over the fiscal year. (CRASH) 
1. Long-run cash effective tax rate, computed as the sum of income tax 
paid (#317) over the previous five years divided by the sum of a 
firm’s pre-tax income (#170) less special items (#17). (LRETR) 
2. Estimated sheltering probability, based on Wilson’s (2009) tax 
sheltering model. (SHELTER) 
3. Common factor extracted from three different book-tax difference 
measures: BTD, ETR Differential, and DD_BTD. BTD is total book-
tax difference, which equals book income less taxable income scaled 
by lagged assets (#6). Book income is pre-tax income (#170) in year 
t. Taxable income is calculated by summing the current federal tax 
expense (#63) and current foreign tax expense (#64) and dividing by 
the statutory tax rate (STR) and then subtracting the change in net 
operating loss (NOL) carryforwards (#52) in year t. ETR Differential 
is permanent book-tax difference based on Frank et al. (2009), 
DD_BTD is residual of 𝐵𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, where TACC is 
total accruals measured using the cash flow method. (BTDFACTOR) 
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Hanlon et al. (2012) Log of audit fees. (Ln(AUDIT FEE)) Log of absolute value the total book-tax differences income (data #170 – 
((data #16 – data #50)/.35 – ∆data#52). (Ln(ABSBTD)) 
 
Lennox et al. (2013) Accounting Fraud. (Fraud) 1. Total tax expense (#16) / Pretax income (#170). (ETR1) 
2. Current federal tax expense (#63) / (Income before extraordinary 
items (#18) + Current federal tax expense (#63) + Minority interest 
(#49) – Extraordinary items (#48) – Equity in earnings (#55)). 
(ETR2) 
3. Total tax expense (#16) – Change in deferred tax (#35) / Operating 
cash flows (#308). (ETR3) 
4. Cash taxes paid (#317) / Pretax income (#170). (ETR4) 
5. Cash taxes paid (#317) / (Pretax income (#170) – Special items 
(#17)). (ETR5) 
6. Pretax income (#170) – ((Current federal tax expense (#63) + foreign 
tax expense (#64)) / statutory marginal tax rate). (BTD1) 
7. BTD1 – (Total deferred tax expense (#50) / statutory marginal tax 
rate). (BTD2) 
8. Discretionary permanent book-tax differences based on Frank et al. 
(2009). (BTD3) 
 
Donohoe and Knechel 
(2014) 
Log of audit fees. (LNFEE) 1. Cash effective tax rate, defined as the six-year sum (t to t-5) of cash 
taxes paid (txpd) divided by the six-year sum of pre-tax book income 
(pi) less special items (spi). We drop observations with negative. 
ETRs are reset to 1 (0) if greater (less) than 1 (0). (CASH6) 
2. Current effective tax rate, defined as the six-year sum (t to t-5) of 
current tax expense (txfed) divided by the six-year sum pre-tax book 
income (pi) less minority interest (mii). If current tax expense is 
missing, we use total tax expense (txt) less the sum of current foreign 
tax expense (txfo), state tax expense (txs), deferred tax expense 
(txdi), and other tax expense (txo). ETRs are reset to 1 (0) if greater 
(less) than 1 (0). (CURR6) 
3. Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is tax aggressive; 0 otherwise. 
Tax aggressiveness is a firm with either a CASH6 or CURR6 in 
lowest quintile by year and two-digit SIC industry membership. (TA) 
 
 
 
Balakrishnan et al. 
(2018) 
1. The absolute analysts’ forecast errors. 
(AFError) 
1. The firm’s mean industry size GAAP ETR less the firm’s GAAP 
ETR, where GAAP_ETR is the sum of current tax expense over years 
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2. The average dispersion of analyst earnings 
forecasts. (AFDisp) 
3. An estimate of the adverse selection component 
of the bid-ask spread. (Spread) 
4. Accruals quality. The standard deviation of 
residuals over the five-year rolling window 
from an industry-year level Dechow-Dichev 
model augmented with fundamental variables 
from Jones model (Francis et al. 2004, 2005). 
(AQ) and other measures based on these 
variables. 
t, t-1 and t-2 divided by the sum of pre-tax income for years t, t-1 and 
t-2. (TA_GAAP) 
2. The firm’s mean industry size CASH ETR less the firm’s CASH 
ETR, where CASH_ETR is the sum of cash paid for taxes for years t, 
t-1 and t-2 divided by the sum of pre-tax income for years t, t-1 and t-
2. (TA_CASH) 
3. The number of times one of the tax haven locations described in 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) are mentioned in Exhibit 21of the current 
year 10K. (TAX_HAVENS) 
4. Discretionary permanent book-tax differences based on Frank et al. 
(2009). (DTAX) 
5. Tax shelter predicted value as described in Wilson (2009). 
(SHELTER) 
6. The ending FIN48 balance scaled by average assets. (FIN48) 
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Figure 1: Relationship between Transparency and Tax avoidance  
Panel A: Effect on Absolute Discretionary Accruals, Standard Deviation of 
Discretionary Accruals, and the probability of Restatement. 
 
Panel B: Effect on Analysts Forecast Errors and Audit Fees 
 
Panel C: Effect on Stock Price Synchronicity, Bid-Ask Spread, And Stock Price 
Crash Risk 
  
Note: This figure visualizes our empirical regression results. The horizontal axes represent our 
measure of tax avoidance, TA GAAP. The vertical axes represent different measures in 
different panels. In Panel A, the vertical axes represent absolute discretionary accruals, earnings 
opacity, and the probability of accounting restatements from left to right, respectively. The 
vertical axes represent analyst forecast errors, and audit fees from left to right in Panel B. The 
vertical axes represent stock price synchronicity, bid-ask spread, and stock price crash risk from 
left to right in Panel C, respectively. All the other controls are set to mean in the figure. 
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Table 1 Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Sample Requirement # of Obs. 
Observations of all the US firms from 1995 to 2016 in 
Compustat_CRSP Merged dataset. 
128,211 
Delete observations with missing CIK code or Ticker, which are used 
to merge AuditAnalytics, I/B/E/S, and Thomson-Reuters. 
(2,769) 
Delete observations of financial and utility firms (i.e., firms with SIC 
4900-4999 or 6000-6999). 
(41,474) 
Delete observations with missing or negative pretax income. (33,060) 
Delete observations with missing data or information to calculate 
discretionary accrual and other financial variables. 
(8,068) 
The final sample of firm-year observations for testing the effect of 
tax avoidance constructed based on GAAP ETR on earnings 
quality. 
42,840 
 
 
Note: This table provides the selection process for the sample used to test the effect of tax avoidance 
on earnings quality when GAAP ETR is used to capture tax avoidance. For tests using other tax 
avoidance measures and other alternative measures of transparency, we remove the observations with 
missing values for these alternative measures from the sample.  
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Table 2  
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
Variable # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 10% 90% 
GAAP ETR  42,840  0.323  0.167  0.022  0.430  
Cash ETR  42,840  0.271  0.226  0.010  0.513  
Current ETR  41,579  0.299  0.211  0.010  0.501  
TA GAAP  42,840  -0.323  0.167  -0.430  -0.022  
TA Cash  42,840  -0.272  0.226  -0.513  -0.010  
TA Current  41,579  -0.299  0.211  -0.500  -0.010  
AbsDA  42,840  0.069 0.091  0.007  0.155  
StdDA  33,766  0.082  0.088  0.021  0.163  
Restate  38,488  0.120  0.325  0 1 
AFError  26,691  0.152  0.261  0.010  0.363  
AuditFee  28,242  -0.212  1.344  -2.025  1.512  
Synch  31,523  -1.359  1.570  -3.460  0.503  
Spread  31,632  0.177  0.245  0.013  0.469  
Ncskew  30,640  0.032  0.847  -0.922  1.022  
LnTA  42,840 6.131  1.925  3.585  8.751  
LEV  42,840 0.476  0.229  0.184  0.763  
ForInc  42,840 0.017  0.034  0 0.060  
PPE  42,840 0.301  0.262  0.049  0.713  
Intang  42,840 0.183  0.237  0 0.502  
PTROA  42,840 0.122 0.097  0.022  0.251  
PTCFO  42,840 0.152  0.120  0.033  0.300  
NOL  42,840 0.710  0.454  0 1 
MB  42,840 2.965  3.886  0.862  5.930  
BigN  42,840 0.525  0.499  0 1 
TradeVol  42,840 17.312  2.021  14.551  19.921  
AnlstCover  42,840 0.986  0.115  1 1 
TACC  31,632  -0.040 0.087 -0.127 0.049 
Sum_Forecast  26,691  3.238  1.175  1.609  4.682  
CashDV  26,691  0.009  0.016  0 0.028  
AccRec  28,242  0.180  0.138  0.036  0.402  
MAO  28,242  0.055  0.229  0 0 
Tenure  28,242  0.144  0.351  0 1 
InstHolding  31,632  0.570  0.285  0.113  0.908  
Price  31,632  2.973  0.954  1.389  4.032  
d_Turn  30,640  0.545  0.498  0 1 
Ret  30,640  -0.002  0.002  -0.004  0.000  
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Table 2  
Panel B Sample Distribution by fiscal year 
Year 
# of  
GAAP ETR 
Mean of 
GAAP ETR 
# of  
Cash ETR 
Mean of 
Cash ETR 
# of  
Current ETR 
Mean of 
Current ETR 
1995 2,637  0.331  2,637  0.308  2,546  0.325  
1996 2,757  0.334  2,757  0.291  2,653  0.326  
1997 2,821  0.349  2,821  0.294  2,693  0.330  
1998 2,633  0.357  2,633  0.312  2,539  0.339  
1999 2,466  0.346  2,466  0.290  2,387  0.324  
2000 2,205  0.351  2,205  0.289  2,134  0.323  
2001 1,793  0.353  1,793  0.288  1,722  0.322  
2002 1,860  0.325  1,860  0.236  1,784  0.264  
2003 1,942  0.319  1,942  0.219  1,869  0.265  
2004 2,062  0.301  2,062  0.214  1,991  0.260  
2005 2,026  0.311  2,026  0.250  1,970  0.294  
2006 1,963  0.312  1,963  0.267  1,903  0.300  
2007 1,845  0.313  1,845  0.280  1,794  0.307  
2008 1,548  0.327  1,548  0.302  1,504  0.310  
2009 1,483  0.310  1,483  0.274  1,452  0.285  
2010 1,715  0.291  1,715  0.237  1,678  0.257  
2011 1,693  0.292  1,693  0.231  1,664  0.249  
2012 1,584  0.308  1,584  0.260  1,562  0.276  
2013 1,525  0.297  1,525  0.273  1,507  0.280  
2014 1,541  0.300  1,541  0.270  1,515  0.284  
2015 1,401  0.303  1,401  0.271  1,385  0.288  
2016 1,340  0.297  1,340  0.258  1,327  0.276  
Total 42,840  0.323  42,840  0.271  41,579  0.299  
Note: This table provides the sample descriptive statistics in Panel A and the sample distribution and the 
mean of the ETRs by year in Panel B.
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Table 3 Effect of Tax Avoidance on Absolute Accruals Management, Uncertainty in Accruals, and Restatement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent Variable= AbsDA AbsDA AbsDA AbsDA StdDA StdDA StdDA StdDA Restate Restate Restate Restate 
TA GAAP 0.025*** 0.160***   0.030*** 0.142***   -0.016* 0.043*   
 (7.34) (19.88)   (7.43) (13.55)   (-1.65) (1.67)   
TA GAAP2  0.179***    0.144***    0.074***   
  (20.07)    (13.06)    (2.66)   
TA Cash   0.084***    0.108***    0.078***  
   (13.20)    (13.15)    (3.17)  
TA Cash2   0.112***    0.113***    0.109***  
   (16.29)    (13.77)    (4.44)  
TA Current    0.103***    0.134***    0.064** 
    (14.63)    (13.43)    (2.51) 
TA Current2    0.135***    0.135***    0.098*** 
    (17.27)    (13.62)    (3.84) 
LnTA -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (-26.58) (-23.04) (-24.32) (-24.01) (-25.57) (-23.37) (-24.15) (-23.74) (-3.64) (-3.18) (-2.90) (-3.11) 
LEV 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.025** 0.023* 0.022* 0.028** 
 (12.70) (11.44) (12.02) (11.40) (9.21) (8.47) (8.40) (8.28) (2.04) (1.88) (1.86) (2.24) 
ForInc -0.073*** -0.084*** -0.060*** -0.055*** -0.126*** -0.138*** -0.114*** -0.104*** -0.114 -0.118 -0.116 -0.088 
 (-4.36) (-5.10) (-3.62) (-3.32) (-5.35) (-5.94) (-4.96) (-4.51) (-1.44) (-1.50) (-1.48) (-1.12) 
PPE 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.043*** -0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.020 
 (11.45) (11.71) (11.30) (10.65) (-0.04) (0.27) (-0.71) (-1.26) (1.30) (1.34) (1.22) (1.43) 
Intang -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-0.89) (-0.78) (-0.90) (-0.98) (-2.88) (-2.76) (-2.82) (-2.86) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.37) (-0.37) 
PTROA 0.365*** 0.399*** 0.401*** 0.398*** 0.149*** 0.177*** 0.173*** 0.172*** -0.089*** -0.074** -0.054* -0.046 
 (26.03) (28.15) (27.96) (26.81) (9.94) (11.46) (11.05) (10.98) (-2.83) (-2.31) (-1.68) (-1.42) 
PTCFO -0.285*** -0.283*** -0.288*** -0.278*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.100*** -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.107*** 
 (-22.45) (-22.60) (-22.69) (-21.34) (-9.64) (-9.76) (-9.26) (-8.52) (-4.45) (-4.43) (-4.38) (-4.66) 
NOL -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
 (-2.34) (-1.36) (-2.12) (-1.66) (-1.23) (-0.77) (-0.81) (-0.91) (-0.47) (-0.40) (-0.35) (-0.67) 
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.52) (1.12) (1.31) (1.20) (0.38) (0.13) (0.14) (0.25) (0.53) (0.48) (0.44) (0.21) 
BigN -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
 (-3.61) (-3.36) (-3.20) (-3.40) (-4.23) (-4.20) (-4.00) (-4.02) (4.31) (4.35) (4.40) (4.49) 
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TradeVol 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (12.93) (9.64) (11.08) (10.90) (15.03) (13.28) (13.85) (13.63) (5.57) (5.20) (5.04) (4.95) 
AnlstCover -0.007* -0.005 -0.007* -0.008** -0.006 -0.005 -0.006* -0.006 -0.029** -0.028** -0.029** -0.029** 
 (-1.80) (-1.48) (-1.88) (-2.03) (-1.61) (-1.28) (-1.68) (-1.59) (-2.38) (-2.31) (-2.35) (-2.28) 
Intercept -0.016* 0.017* -0.009 -0.002 -0.018 0.008 -0.002 0.008     
 (-1.68) (1.71) (-0.89) (-0.19) (-1.18) (0.52) (-0.10) (0.51)     
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
ETRs at the Inflection point  0.447 0.375 0.381  0.493 0.478 0.496  0.291 0.358 0.327 
             
Percentage of observations with 
ETRs > Inflection point 
 9.1% 24.7% 27.7%  6.3% 11.5% 10.4%  72.5% 27.1% 44.1% 
             
N 42,840 42,840 42,840 41,579 33,766 33,766 33,766 32,840 38,488 38,488 38,488 37,286 
R2 0.220 0.234 0.227 0.222 0.220 0.229 0.226 0.229 0.080 0.081 0.082 0.083 
 
Note: Column (1) to column (8) of his table uses OLS regression analyses to test the effect of tax avoidance on accruals management and uncertainty in accruals. The last four 
columns use logit regression analyses to test the effect of tax avoidance on accounting restatement. We report the marginal effect at the mean and pseudo-R2 for the last four 
columns. We cluster all standard errors by firm. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
See the appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 4 Effect of Tax Avoidance on Analysts Forecast Errors and Audit Fees  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable= AFError AFError AFError AFError AuditFee AuditFee AuditFee AuditFee 
TA GAAP 0.030** 0.403***   0.049* 0.626***   
 (2.00) (10.66)   (1.67) (8.51)   
TA GAAP2  0.469***    0.743***   
  (11.34)    (9.67)   
TA Cash   0.263***    -0.049  
   (8.57)    (-0.75)  
TA Cash2   0.405***    0.107  
   (11.91)    (1.63)  
TA Current    0.315***    0.119* 
    (9.19)    (1.70) 
TA Current2    0.407***    0.259*** 
    (11.06)    (3.65) 
LnTA 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.524*** 0.528*** 0.526*** 0.524*** 
 (3.43) (4.66) (4.73) (4.47) (88.85) (89.71) (87.89) (88.01) 
LEV 0.068*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.383*** 0.368*** 0.383*** 0.371*** 
 (4.77) (4.27) (4.22) (4.24) (10.75) (10.33) (10.55) (10.09) 
ForInc -0.150* -0.176** -0.091 -0.095 2.832*** 2.784*** 2.872*** 2.830*** 
 (-1.84) (-2.21) (-1.15) (-1.20) (13.31) (13.05) (13.48) (13.20) 
PPE 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.003 -0.544*** -0.540*** -0.555*** -0.533*** 
 (0.71) (0.61) (0.54) (0.15) (-13.10) (-13.10) (-13.28) (-12.70) 
Intang -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.046 -0.042 -0.052 -0.040 
 (-7.41) (-7.52) (-7.92) (-7.35) (-1.42) (-1.32) (-1.58) (-1.20) 
PTROA -0.013 0.085** 0.111*** 0.105*** -0.728*** -0.596*** -0.693*** -0.689*** 
 (-0.35) (2.22) (2.86) (2.68) (-9.47) (-7.59) (-8.57) (-8.53) 
TACC 0.187*** 0.165*** 0.184*** 0.189*** -0.135** -0.189*** -0.119* -0.090 
 (5.34) (4.77) (5.43) (5.49) (-2.13) (-2.98) (-1.85) (-1.39) 
Sum_Forecast -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003     
 (-1.08) (-0.76) (-0.84) (-0.63)     
CashDV -0.282 -0.344* -0.392** -0.331*     
 (-1.45) (-1.79) (-2.07) (-1.67)     
TradeVol -0.012** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018***     
 (-2.49) (-3.87) (-3.89) (-3.63)     
InstHolding -0.014 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008     
 (-0.91) (-0.25) (-0.35) (-0.52)     
BigN     0.324*** 0.321*** 0.322*** 0.327*** 
     (14.38) (14.34) (13.96) (14.23) 
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AccRec     0.340*** 0.352*** 0.328*** 0.343*** 
     (5.09) (5.32) (4.82) (5.03) 
MAO     0.057* 0.039 0.053 0.065** 
     (1.80) (1.21) (1.58) (2.00) 
Tenure     -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.026*** 
     (-2.63) (-2.68) (-2.92) (-2.66) 
Intercept 0.250*** 0.377*** 0.322*** 0.311*** -4.415*** -4.348*** -4.450*** -4.448*** 
 (3.19) (4.82) (4.08) (4.11) (-17.51) (-17.51) (-17.03) (-17.46) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
ETRs at Inflection point  0.428 0.325 0.387  0.421 N/A 0.230 
         
Percentage of observations with 
ETRs >Inflection point 
 10.3% 35.5% 24.3%  10.2% N/A 60.4% 
         
N 26,691 26,691 26,077 26,036 28,242 28,242 27,453 27,433 
R2 0.081 0.091 0.099 0.093 0.824 0.826 0.825 0.825 
 
Note: This table uses OLS regression analyses to test the effect of tax avoidance on analysts forecast errors and audit fees. We cluster standard errors by firm. 
We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. See the appendix for variable 
definitions.  
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Table 5 Effect of Tax Avoidance on Stock Price Behavior 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent Variable= Synch Synch Synch Synch Spread Spread Spread Spread Ncskewt+1 Ncskewt+1 Ncskewt+1 Ncskewt+1 
TA GAAP 0.142*** 0.487***   0.006 0.079***   0.061* 0.268***   
 (3.07) (4.53)   (0.72) (3.75)   (1.85) (3.77)   
TA GAAP2  0.449***    0.098***    0.270***   
  (3.89)    (4.62)    (3.26)   
TA Cash   0.283***    0.054***    0.235***  
   (3.00)    (2.95)    (3.72)  
TA Cash2   0.301***    0.063***    0.242***  
   (3.04)    (3.45)    (3.06)  
TA Current    0.138    0.070***    0.289*** 
    (1.39)    (3.75)    (4.43) 
TA Current2    0.202*    0.076***    0.296*** 
    (1.93)    (4.04)    (3.81) 
LnTA 0.409*** 0.409*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 (37.02) (37.06) (36.70) (36.76) (8.95) (8.98) (8.81) (8.84) (-0.37) (-0.39) (0.13) (-0.24) 
LEV -0.487*** -0.488*** -0.487*** -0.488*** -0.020 -0.022 -0.023* -0.021 -0.068** -0.068** -0.082*** -0.068** 
 (-8.72) (-8.74) (-8.53) (-8.59) (-1.55) (-1.64) (-1.68) (-1.55) (-2.23) (-2.23) (-2.61) (-2.19) 
ForInc 0.534* 0.515* 0.631** 0.655** -0.046 -0.050 -0.037 -0.043 -0.066 -0.077 -0.040 -0.064 
 (1.80) (1.74) (2.12) (2.21) (-0.93) (-1.01) (-0.76) (-0.87) (-0.40) (-0.47) (-0.24) (-0.39) 
PPE -0.053 -0.051 -0.048 -0.056 -0.026** -0.026*** -0.024** -0.028*** 0.060** 0.061** 0.055** 0.040 
 (-0.97) (-0.95) (-0.86) (-0.99) (-2.55) (-2.58) (-2.33) (-2.71) (2.26) (2.30) (2.02) (1.48) 
Intang -0.242*** -0.240*** -0.239*** -0.248*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.033*** 0.062** 0.064** 0.066** 0.054** 
 (-5.72) (-5.68) (-5.57) (-5.76) (-3.78) (-3.77) (-3.46) (-3.79) (2.33) (2.39) (2.41) (1.99) 
PTROA 1.261*** 1.323*** 1.333*** 1.305*** 0.152*** 0.170*** 0.166*** 0.171*** 0.416*** 0.455*** 0.454*** 0.486*** 
 (12.05) (12.37) (12.06) (11.85) (7.06) (7.42) (7.04) (7.30) (6.93) (7.42) (7.21) (7.77) 
TACC 0.178* 0.159* 0.212** 0.226** 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.021 0.155** 0.145** 0.206*** 0.170*** 
 (1.92) (1.72) (2.24) (2.40) (0.97) (0.71) (0.93) (1.21) (2.47) (2.30) (3.21) (2.65) 
AnlstCover 0.114** 0.117** 0.152*** 0.110** 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.062* 0.063* 0.058 0.059 
 (2.11) (2.18) (2.80) (2.02) (0.90) (1.01) (0.88) (0.95) (1.66) (1.69) (1.53) (1.53) 
InstHolding 0.871*** 0.871*** 0.870*** 0.871*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 
 (15.45) (15.45) (15.12) (15.13) (-2.80) (-2.65) (-2.83) (-2.85) (8.32) (8.34) (8.03) (8.16) 
Price 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.082*** 
 (4.16) (4.48) (4.33) (4.41) (12.64) (12.67) (12.34) (12.45) (9.37) (9.70) (8.99) (9.62) 
TradeVol     -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070***     
     (-15.51) (-15.36) (-15.12) (-15.24)     
d_Turn         0.029*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 
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         (2.92) (2.84) (2.61) (2.79) 
Ret         -9.081*** -8.193*** -8.791*** -8.263*** 
         (-3.52) (-3.19) (-3.19) (-3.13) 
Ncskewt         0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
         (4.96) (4.97) (4.77) (4.76) 
Intercept -5.046*** -5.013*** -5.136*** -5.144*** 1.238*** 1.257*** 1.256*** 1.250*** -0.710*** -0.687*** -0.690*** -0.689*** 
 (-21.45) (-21.22) (-22.57) (-22.27) (22.59) (22.13) (22.26) (22.34) (-6.32) (-6.11) (-6.01) (-5.79) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
ETRs at Inflection 
point 
 0.542 0.470 0.342  0.403 0.429 0.461  0.496 0.485 0.488 
             
Percentage of 
observations with 
ETRs >Inflection 
point 
 5.1% 11.4% 37.8%  14.4% 14.7% 12.1%  6.2% 10.6% 10.1% 
             
N 31,523 31,523 30,683 30,691 31,632 31,632 30,790 30,796 30,640 30,640 29,815 29,814 
R2 0.538 0.539 0.538 0.539 0.576 0.576 0.578 0.577 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.037 
 
Note: This table uses OLS regression analyses to test the effect of tax avoidance on stock price informativeness, stock price spread and crash risk. We cluster 
standard errors by firm. We report t-statistics in parentheses.  ***, **, and * refer to significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. See the 
appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 6 Robust Tests 
Panel A: Firm fixed effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable= AbsDA StdDA Restate AFError AuditFee Synch Spread Ncskewt+1 
TA GAAP 0.138*** 0.043*** 0.041 0.350*** 0.246*** 0.033 -0.012 0.184** 
 (20.56) (6.83) (0.77) (11.18) (5.71) (0.32) (-0.84) (2.09) 
TA GAAP2 0.151*** 0.049*** 0.069* 0.398*** 0.250*** 0.023 0.001 0.150 
 (20.70) (7.17) (1.72) (11.80) (5.33) (0.20) (0.08) (1.55) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 42,840 33,766 16,340 26,691 28,242 31,523 31,632 30,640 
Within R2 0.124 0.060  0.0441 0.626 0.263 0.552 0.039 
Between R2 0.362 0.243  0.007 0.791 0.574 0.591 0.012 
Overall R2 0.175 0.145  0.008 0.777 0.494 0.556 0.019 
Pseudo R2   0.224      
Panel B: Subsample after Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
Panel C: Long-term measures of tax avoidance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DependentVariable= AbsDA StdDA Restate AFError AuditFee Synch Spread Ncskewt+1 
TALT3 0.120*** 0.172*** 0.039 0.260*** 0.475*** 0.395*** 0.086*** 0.300*** 
 (13.49) (13.63) (1.32) (4.81) (5.47) (3.22) (3.74) (3.58) 
TALT32 0.108*** 0.165*** 0.056* 0.267*** 0.680*** 0.308** 0.101*** 0.310*** 
 (12.19) (13.34) (1.84) (4.81) (7.77) (2.33) (4.35) (3.19) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable= AbsDA StdDA Restate AFError AuditFee Synch Spread Ncskewt+1 
TA GAAP 0.170*** 0.136*** 0.101** 0.593*** 0.546*** 0.137 0.081*** 0.260*** 
 (16.20) (10.06) (2.40) (9.37) (6.99) (1.14) (3.63) (2.93) 
TA GAAP2 0.177*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.659*** 0.683*** 0.114 0.081*** 0.202* 
 (16.13) (9.62) (3.04) (9.70) (8.29) (0.87) (3.79) (1.95) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 23,668 20,098 19,367 17,676 23,393 20,225 20,292 19,345 
R2 0.201 0.237 0.0404 0.093 0.812 0.545 0.350 0.024 
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Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 36,702 30,697 36,612 23,663 24,300 27,689 27,780 26,856 
R2 0.193 0.218 0.0808 0.073 0.832 0.545 0.582 0.033 
Panel D: Change Analyses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ∆AbsDA ∆AQ ∆Restate ∆AFError ∆AuditFee ∆Synch ∆Spread ∆FNcskew 
∆TA GAAP 0.046*** 0.005** 0.057*** 0.122*** 0.095*** -0.131 -0.005 -0.063 
 (6.84) (2.03) (3.67) (4.94) (3.35) (-1.33) (-0.88) (-0.82) 
TA GAAP 0.011*** 0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.062*** 0.033 0.013*** 0.114*** 
 (3.53) (1.40) (-0.21) (0.30) (-3.73) (0.69) (3.23) (2.69) 
∆TA GAAP*TA GAAP 0.102*** 0.015*** 0.113*** 0.284*** 0.122** -0.143 0.004 -0.086 
 (8.79) (3.13) (4.02) (5.92) (2.11) (-0.78) (0.31) (-0.59) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
∆TAGAAP ˗ 
∆TAGAAP*TAGAA -0.056 -0.010 -0.056 -0.162 -0.027 0.012 -0.009 0.023 
F-test 43.00*** 8.75*** 7.51*** 21.17*** 1.98 0.00 1.27 0.04 
         
N 34,596 26,125 30,952 21,536 21,448 26,047 26,141 25,268 
R2 0.073 0.029 0.0541 0.025 0.189 0.100 0.087 0.245 
Panel E: The Effect of Tax Avoidance on Transparency of year t+1  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 AbsDAt+1 StdDAt+1 Restatet+1 AFErrort+1 AuditFeet+1 Syncht+1 Spreadt+1 
TA GAAP 0.078*** 0.151*** 0.052* 0.279*** 0.507*** 0.941*** 0.084*** 
 (9.15) (12.23) (1.67) (5.24) (5.88) (7.48) (3.36) 
TA GAAP2 0.066*** 0.151*** 0.060* 0.313*** 0.645*** 0.920*** 0.094*** 
 (7.27) (11.54) (1.65) (4.98) (6.92) (6.57) (3.85) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 32,679 27,841 30,539 21,078 21,712 25,376 25,420 
R2 0.137 0.224 0.064 0.083 0.822 0.541 0.570 
Note: This table reports all the additional tests. Control variables are included in the regressions but not reported. Panel A controls for firm fixed effects. Panel B 
uses a subsample of years after 2002. Panel C uses long-term tax avoidance measures. Panel D provides the change analyses. Δ is used to take the first diference 
of a variable. Panel E reruns the primary tests using transparency measures from year t+1. Control variables are all included in these tests but not reported. We 
cluster standard errors by firm in Panels B, and C. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. See the appendix for variable definitions.  
